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Introduction
Firms in an oligopoly are not always in an adversarial relationship. In a recentbookentitled Co-opetition," Nalebu and Brandenburger 1996 describe many real world situations of alliances between rival rms. They develop the theme that rms may modify the rules of their games in order to achieve partial cooperation while remaining rivals in the nal good market 1 . Their insightful discussion is an invitation for economists to develop a unifying framework for the analysis of a class of games in which rival rms have the ability, in an earlier stage of the game, to determine the set of actions or outcomes that are admissible in the subsequent subgames. An interesting example of two-stage games that involve cooperation at one level and rivalry at another level is the creation of competing divisions within a multi-divisional rm. Baye, Crocker and Ju 1996 analyze strategic incentives to divide production among autonomous competing units through divisionalization, franchising, or divestiture". A related phenomenon is the establishment o f a n i n ternal input market within an oligopoly, of which the intra rm resource ows and knowlegde ows constitute a special case. It may be argued that these ows are created partly to in uence the outcome of rivalry in a second stage of a game. Trade between parent rms and their foreign a liates that are potential rivals e.g. Sony products made in Malaysia versus almost identical Sony products made in China may be analyzed in terms of a two-stage game. The importance of intra rm resource ows is well documented in the World Investment Report 1993. In manufacturing, the share of intra rm transactions in foreign sales by US foreign a liates rose from 30 per cent to 36 per cent o v er the period 1977-89. Data for the US on royalties and licence fees indicate that more than 70 per cent of all receipts and 50 per cent of all payments were intra-transnational corporation transactions World Investment Report, 1993, p.164..
Another example of two-stage games is the formation of a production joint v enture denoted as PJV, as distinct from research joint v enture, RJV by rival rms 2 . Many production joint v entures have the features that participants that use the joint v enture's output as their intermediate inputs are rivals in the nal good market. Gale 1994 cites as examples i rms sharing natural gas pipelines, ii an aluminium rolling mill jointly owned by Alcan and Arco. Participants cooperate in the alloca-tion of the output of the PJV to them, who act as rivals in a diferent stage of the game. 3 In this paper we provide a general methodology for analyzing a class of two-stage games among oligopolists, and illustrate the usefulness of our approach b y considering a number of applications. We are concerned with games of cost manipulation in the presence of costs of manipulation". The costs of manipulating costs play an important role. These costs may be in the form of internal production of an essential input, capacity c hoice, or choice of the rm's locatio, etc. We seek to characterize the solution of this type of games in terms of the concavity or convexity of the overall objective function in the rst stage. Our resolution is geometric in nature. We show that the stage one objective function may display, under quite general assumptions, a fundamental convexity in the choice variables.
A major common thread in the applications that we focus on is the following broad issue: why d o i n ternal markets for certain crucial inputs emerge within an oligopoly? It will be seen that a large organization consisting of independent rival units may h a v e an incentive to generate an internal input market as a means of fostering collusion.While we analyse only a few examples, it will become clear that our framework is suitable for the analysis of various aspects of behavior of multi-divisional rms, multi-national rms, production joint v entures, and so on. In addition to providing a general framework of analysis, we also obtain some speci c results. Among these is the result that, contrary to the general presumption that ex-ante symmetric rms will choose to be ex-post symmetric in their joint pro t maximization decisions, it is quite often the case that the solution of the above class of games is asymmetric, even if rms are ex-ante symmetric. The intuition behind this result is as follows. In a Cournot oligopoly 4 , with a xed number of rms each h a ving a constant marginal cost, the equilibrium industry output in stage 2 depends only on the sum of their marginal costs see Bergstrom and Varian 1985a;  it follows that if this sum is kept constant, while some rms' marginal costs are made to increase and other rms'marginal costs are made to decrease, then industry output, price, and total revenue will remain un-3 Two-stage games of a similar nature, with or without collusion or government intervention in the rst stage, include learning-by-doing by oligopolists rst period output levels have an in uence on second period cost; see Fudenberg and Tirole 1983, Krouse 1994 for example; technology choice investment decision concerning equipment t ypes in period one determines the level of constant marginal cost in period two; see DeGraba 1990, and Newbery 1990, especially pp.344-345. 4 More generally, a modi ed version of his result applies also to Bertrand games, Stackelberg games, and games involving location such as the Hotelling and Salop models.
changed, and therefore industry pro t will rise because the same total output is now produced at lower cost as rms with decreased marginal costs will expand their market shares at the expense of rms with increased marginal costs. This is the e ciency motive for cost manipulation. In the context of a simple model of research joint v enture without the cost of manipulating costs, this result has been formalized by Long and Soubeyran 5 1995a: industry pro t is an increasing function of the variance of the distribution of the constant marginal costs. In this paper, we deal with the issue of manipulation of marginal costs in a much more general fashion, by i introducing real resource costs of manipulating costs, ii providing a global characterization of the solution, and iii dealing with both the cases of constant marginal costs and rising marginal costs. Our approach relies on the decomposition principle see Rockafellar, 1970 , Section 28, or Luenberger 1969 It is clear from the above discussion that asymmetric solution to a symmetric problem arises when there is lack of concavity in the objective function. By deriving the properties of the equilibrium pro t function for oligopoly, our model explains a key source of this lack of concavity. But we should point out that there are situations where the cost of manipulation of costs has a high degree of convexity, so that the objective function becomes concave, giving rise to the optimality of symmetric solutions. Both cases are discussed in Section 2, where we also treat the more realistic case where rms are ex-ante asymmetric.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the general methodology and some general results, under the assumption that marginal costs are independent of the scale of output. Section 3 extends the results to the case of multiplicatively separable scale-dependent marginal costs. In Section 4 we illustrate the use of our general method on some speci c applications. Section 5 and the Appendix o ers some 5 A closely related result was proved by Bergstrom and Varian 1985b. They assume that rms have identical constant marginal costs, but face di erent tax rates, and show that tax revenue is a decreasing function of the variance of the tax rates. At a less formal level, several authors have provided numerical examples where an increase in the dispersion of constant marginal costs in a duopoly will increase the sum of their pro ts. See Newbery 1990, pp. 344-345 and Salant and Sha er 1992. Neither paper gave a formula relating industry pro t to the variance of the distribution of marginal costs and both papers assumed linear demand. While working on the present paper, we received a paper by Salant and Sha er 1996 addressing the same topic. The latter paper gives su cient conditions for a solution to be asymmetric, in terms of gains achieved by a marginal deviation from a symmetric point. Our approach is di erent: we provide a global resolution of a convex or concave problem, and characterize fully the degree of asymmetry. The question concerning the integer number of rms achieving di erent levels of cost reduction in the optimal solution is also answered. further extensions.
The Model
We consider an oligopoly consisting of m rms that produce a homogenous good. Let M f 1 ; 2 ; :::; mg: Let q i denote rm i's output, i 2 M.
The inverse demand function is P = PQ; P 0 Q 0 where Q = P i2M q i . Generalization to the case where P = PQ + Q where Q is the output of another set of rms, possibly located somewhere else, can be easily achieved at a small cost, in terms of additional notation. Assume that rm i's current marginal cost of production is independent of its current output level q i but is dependent on the level of a c hoice variable made in an earlier stage, such as the rm's investment in capital equipment, or the amount o f e n trepreneurial time committed to monitoring, or accumulated experience, or the result of R&D in previous periods. For simplicity, w e represent this variable by a non-negative real number e i . We capture the cost-saving e ect of e i by postulating that the marginal cost of output is decreasing in e i : In some applications, the cost reduction achieved by one rm may depend not only on its choice variable such as its nominal R&D expenditure but also on the activity of other rms eg. their nominal R&D expenditures because of spillover e ects. In such cases, our formulation 1 need to be re-interpreted; for example, in the presence of R&D spillovers, e i would then represents rm i 's e ective R&D, which i s a v ariable that takes into account the spillover e ects.See Long and Soubeyran 1995b.
The class of two-stage Cournot games considered in this paper has the following main charateristic: in the rst stage, the variables e i are either collusively determined, or are independently chosen by the rms under the direct in uence of a dominant actor as in the case of a government agency that allocates rm-speci c R&D subsidies, or that imposes rm-speci c pollution standards. This determines each rm's constant marginal cost in stage two, when the rms are Cournot rivals. In the case of collusive behavior in stage one, the objective is to maximize joint pro ts. In the case of a dominant actor, the objective m a y b e t o maximize some social welfare function if the dominant actor is a government agency. Regardless of the speci c formulation of the problem in stage one, a necessary step in understanding the game is to analyze the Cournot equilibrium in stage two. We n o w turn to this task.
Analysis of Cournot equilibrium in stage two
At the beginning of stage two, the variables e i have been chosen. Firm i's marginal cost is then c i e i ; which w e denote in this subsection by c i for short. We assume that for each i the feasible range of e i is 0; e max i . This It is useful to state our assumptions more formally:
Assumption E: There exists some positive Q such that Q , Q 0 for all Q greater than Q , and for all output level Q Q , the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve is less than m + 1 :
Assumption I: For all C in the range C min ; C max , c i P b Q C for all i:
Assumption I ensures that all rms produces in equilibrium. We are now ready to state a few important lemmas, the rst one being a simple re-statement of a result stated in Bergstrom-Varian 1985a. 6 Lemma 1:Under assumptions S, E and I, the equilibrium industry output b Q is uniquely determined by C and is independent of the distribution of marginal costs among the oligopolists.
Having determined the function b QC, we can now express the equilibrium output of rm i , and its equilibrium pro t, as a function of only two parameters, C and c i . Remark: The second term in the numerator of 9 is the square of the average mark-up. The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follow. Take the simplest case where the industry consists of two identical rms. Now let rm 1's constant marginal cost be shifted upward by and that of rm 2 be shifted downward by . The two reaction functions will then be shifted, one outwards and the other inwards, in a compensating fashion, and hence the industry equilibrium output will remain unchanged. Hence the equilibrium price and industry revenue are una ected. On the other hand, industry production cost will be lower than before, because more than half of industry output will be produced by the lower cost rm. It follows that industry pro t will be greater than before.
The above argument shows that the Cournot oligopolists have an incentive to a ect a change in the distribution of marginal costs among rms as the gainers can more than compensate the losers, if such redistribution does not use up any signi cant amount of real resources and does not violate anti-trust laws. In what follows, we deal with the more general case where the manipulation of marginal costs involves real resource costs.
The next result links average industry pro t to the Her ndahl index of industry concentration:
Corollary 1:Link between Industry Pro t and the Her ndahl Index Given the marginal cost sum C, the equilibrium industry pro t is an increasing function of the Her ndahl index of concentration.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Next, consider social welfare, de ned as the sum of consumers' surplus and producers' surplus. Consumers' surplus is Corollary 2: For a given sum C of marginal costs, an increase in the Her ndahl index, made possible by increasing the dispersion of the distribution of marginal costs, will improve both industry pro t and social welfare.
Analysis of Stage 1: Manipulation of Marginal Costs
We now turn to Stage 1. This stage is characterized by some sort of collusive behavior. In the most obvious applications, the rival rms collude by reallocating resources among themselves so that for any given marginal cost sum C they maximize their joint pro ts. The problem would be trivial if rms can costlessly redistribute" their marginal costs, in the sense that one rm's marginal cost could be reduced by as long as another rm's marginal cost is increased by . We deal with the more realistic case where redistribution of marginal costs involves real costs, which m a y be called cost of manipulating costs".
It is convenient t o i n v ert the cost reduction function r i e i to obtain e i = e i r i ; where r i is restricted to be in the interval 0; r max To facilitate an intuitive comprehension of the nature of this problem, and particularly, to sharpen the focus on the crucial issue of asymmetric versus symmetric solutions, it is helpful to decompose the problem 16 into two subproblems. First, for a given r M ; how should the r i 's be chosen? The second subproblem is the choice of the optimal r M . It is the rst subproblem that commands our attention here, because the question of optimality of asymmetric allocation when rms are ex-ante symmetric is not well understood. The separation of the two subproblems has the avor of the traditional separation of income and substitution e ects in the theory of the consumer, or the separation of cost minimization from pro t maximization in the theory of the rm. The solution of this subproblem 7 yields r i = r i r M . In the second subproblem, the optimum r M is determined. The main merit of this two-step procedure is that when we x r M w e e ectively x the Cournot equilibrium price and thus we are able to separate the revenue considerations, as represented by the term PQr M Q , from the cost minimization considerations the allocation of cost reductions among rms, holding r M constant, and the tradeo between, on the one hand, the e ciency gain resulting from this allocation, and on the other hand, the costs of manipulating costs, as represented by the change in the sum of the i e i 's.
In what follows we will analyze the rst subproblem only, and the the second subproblem will be dealt with in Appendix 2. In general : is not zero. We will focus on three cases. In the rst two cases, we assume that all rms are ex-ante identical, so that for all i in f1; 2; :::; mg, c i = c; r max i = r max ; etc., while in the third case, we 7 It can be shown that all q i are positive when the r i 's are between 0 and r max .
allow rms to be ex-ante asymmetric, but the function : is strictly concave.
Case 1 Ex ante identical rms, strictly concave objective function: : is su ciently convex in r such that r is strictly concave i n r despite the convexity o f v r .
Case 2 Ex ante identical rms, strictly convex objective function: : is concave or linear or only mildly convex in r; so that r is strictly convex in r.
Case 3 Ex ante asymmetric rms, strictly concave objective function This follows from the fact that : is symmetric and strictly concave in r 1 ; :::; r m .
In Case 2, we consider two subcases.
Subcase 2a: mr M r max Subcase 2b: mr M r max Without loss of generality, we adopt the convention that whenever there is an asymmetric solution -that is, r i 6 = r j , for some pair i; j-we will describe it in the form r 1 r 2 r 3 ::: r m . We n o w state our ii If the objective function r is strictly concave, i.e., Case 1, then the solution is symmetric, as given by 21.
iii If r is neither concave nor convex, then it is possible to have t w o or more levels of cost reductions that are in the interior of the set Gr M .
Remark: Proposition 4 tells us that, given that rms are ex-ante identical, in the strictly convex case, the solution is asymmetric in a simple way: there are at most three types of rms, with one bunch at the top achieving the maximum possible cost reduction, one bunch at the bottom achieving no reduction in cost and at most a single rm that Since the left-hand side of 24 is increasing in r h due to the assumption that : is convex, it follows that r i = r j = r , s a y . But then a small departure from this common value r by adding to r i and substracting from r j will improves the value of r as given in 23. In particular, note that the rst term on the right hand side of 23 is the familiar variance expression, which will increase with such a departure. At the same time, the cost of manipulating costs term", the third term, being the sum of m identical concave functions, decreases with such a departure.
It follows that at most one rm can have a n i n termediate cost reduction level 0 r r max :
More formally, let x denote the greatest integer smaller than or equal to the real numberx. The requirements that i In this section we illustrate the usefulness of our approach by applying it to a number of problems. The models we consider below exhibit a common theme: an internal allocation problem is solved within an oligopoly, and the solution often takes the form of the emergence of an internal market for productive resources. This solution has a collusive e ect on the behavior of the rms or independent divisions of a m ulti-divisional rm that must behave as rivals in the second stage. The outcome may i n v olve unequal treatment of equals. While we focus on multi-divisional rms and transfer of productive assets, other obvious applications suggest themselves: production joint-ventures, subcontracting, internal market for intermediate goods. External input markets can also be analyzed in a similar fashion. One can think of problems such a s reciprocal access, and access pricing in telecommunication, for example, the establishment of an input-purchasing cartel, and so on. Veendorf 1991 has pointed out that while divisions are allowed to make their own output decisions, capacity decisions are often made centrally. He showed that centralized capacity decisions can improved the pro t of a divisionalized rm. However, he assumed for simplicity that all divisions have the same allocated capacity, or capital stock. In this sub-section, we apply our method developed in Sections 2 and 3 to shed light on the possible optimality of asymmetric capacity allocation by a divisionalized rm.
Divisionalization and capacity decisions
We now describe our model. A monopolist is facing the threat of entry of a potential rival rm. He must decide whether to accommodate entry, or to pre-empt it. The game structure is as follows. In stage 1, the monopolist decides on the number of independent divisions it will set up. These divisions are instructed to maximize divisional pro t, and to behave as Cournot rivals. In stage 2, the monopolist makes centralized capacity decision for each division. Here, we i n terpret capacity" not as an upper limit on output, but as the size of the capital stock, which a ects marginal cost. In stage 3, the potential entrant c hooses whether to enter or not, and the number of divisions to be set up if it enters; at this stage it incurs a set-up cost A e 0 per division if the decision is to enter. In stage four, if there is entry, then the divisions of the entrant and the divisions of the incumbent compete as Cournot rivals; if there is no entry, the divisions of the incumbent also compete as Cournot rivals.
We solve the game backwards, and consider stage four rst. Suppose that entry has taken place in stage 3. Assume for simplicity that the entrant is a divisionalized rm with n divisions, all with the same capacity, and that each of the entrant's division has a constant marginal cost e . The incumbent has m divisions, and the capacity of division i is k i . Let q i denotes the output of division i. We assume that the variable for all n 1. It can be shown that if 43 holds for n = 1 then it also holds for n 1: an increase in the number of rivalrous divisions will reduce the net pro t of each division, and hence, if each division is making a negative net pro t, the sum of their net pro ts will fall. 10 .
The potential entrant's decision can be written as n = n ; m .
In Stage 2, given that the number of divisions of the incumbent rm is m, the incumbent decides on the investment allocations across its divisions. This amounts to choosing the i 's, taking as given the potential entrant's decision rule n = n ; m , to maximize
In what follows, due to space limitation, we will restrict attention to the case where parameter values are such that the incumbent nds it optimal to prevent entry. Then M is chosen to satisfy 43. We then seek to nd out if, at the optimal M , the investment allocation is A digression: The optimal number of divisions.
As noted above, if k is su ciently convex, we will have a symmetric solution. In this case, under linear demand, it is relatively simple to calculate the optimal number of divisions from the point of view of the incumbent rm.
Production Joint Ventures
It is not uncommon for rival rms to jointly own a production joint venture. For examples, rival gas distributors may own a common gas pipeline, which reduce their distribution costs. In stage 1, the rms jointly decide on the total capacity of the pipeline, and the fraction of the total capacity to be allocated to individual participants. In stage 2, they are Cournot rivals. We will show that, under certain conditions, rms that are ex-ante symmetric would nd it pro table to be unequal ex-post.
Let E denote the capacity of the pipeline, and UE the total cost of having that capacity. Let e i denote the amount of capacity allocated to rm i, and E = P m i=1 e i . Here we assume that capacity does not constrain output, but it has a favorable impact on distribution cost: the greater is the capacity, the lower is the distribution cost per unit.
Consider rst the nal stage of the game, when the decisions on the e i 's and hence on E h a v e been made. Firm i's distribution cost per unit of output is given by 1. Assume that rm i must pay a share of the capacity cost. Its payment i s E e i where E = U E =E. Firm i's net pro t is net i = P q i , c i ,r i e i q i , Ee i
Again, we i n v ert r i e i t o g e t e i = e i r i .
The equilibrium net pro t is where x is a vector with the typical component x i given by 18. In the rst stage of the games, the rms jointly make the decisions on the r i 's to maximize the sum of their pro ts, given that they will be rivals in the product market. It is easy to construct numerical examples showing that the optimal solution involves asymmetric allocation of capacity t o participants of the production joint v entures. An example is available from the authors, upon request.
Inter rm Transfer of Productive Assets
This section is an attempt to incorporate the idea, advanced by managerial writers, that rms are characterized by collections of resources that must be developed internally. This is known the resource-based approach 11 . The resource-based view tends to explain di erences in performance across rms in terms of access to, and ability to develop valuable resources that enhance e ciency. We s k etch below a model in which rms develop their resources internally with a view of reducing cost. We then add the observation that rival rms may transfer internally developed resources among themselves as a means of fostering collusion 12 .
Consider 
Semi-collusion in Bertrand Games
Consider a multidivisional rm that has m independent divisions pro- In the rst stage of the game, the multi-divisional rm allocate capital stocks to the division, so as to maximize overall pro t. The two-stage game with Bertrand competition in the second stage is therefore very similar to the two-stage Cournot games analyzed in Section 2.
Semi-collusion in the Hotelling model of location
In thee Hotelling model see Tirole 1988 , pp. 279-281 with a linear city, it is assumed that two rms compete in prices in the second stage, and make their location choice in the rst stage. Consumers are uniformly located in the city, and they incur a quadratic transport cost td 2 if d is the distance they must travel to get to good. The two extremes of the linear city are denoted by 0 and 1. Let a and b be rm 1's and rm 2's location respectively, where 0 a b 1. Tirole 1988, p. 281 shows that the Nash equilibrium choice of location exhibits maximal distance between the rms. Our approach can be adapted to study the collusive c hoice of location in the rst stage of the game. To generalize the model a bit further, assume that a rm's unit cost depends on its location, possibly because of proximity to input suppliers etc. It can be shown that given a and b, the equilibrium pro ts in stage one are 1 Suppose, for example, that each rm's cost is a decreasing function of its distance from the city center the point 1 = 2. Then V M will be minimized when a = b = 1 = 2. Since 57 is increasing in V M there is an incentive for the two rms to agree to be located rather far apart. The precise solution depends on the speci cation of the functions c 1 a and c 2 1,b, and examples can be constructed to show that asymmetric locations are optimal for this semi-collusion problem.
Conclusion
We have provided a framework for analysis of two-stage games of cost manipulation, where the manipulation involves real resource costs. The basic model of this paper describes one important aspect of co-opetition" within an oligopoly: how rival rms jointly manipulate their costs of production, by implicit or explicit cooperation, using real resource, in the rst stage of the game. This form of semi-collusion can place semi rival rms in a better position in the second stage, where they are really rivals. We showed that cost manipulations may give rise to symmetric or asymmetric outcomes. We c haracterized the solution, using a global approach, and show the geometric nature of the solution. We focused on the constant marginal cost case, but the generalization given in Section 3, for the case of`rankable convex costs', the rst application in Section 4, and the extensions considered in Appendix A2 show that our approach has a wide range of applications.
The various applications discussed in this paper share a common characteristic: rms' marginal costs are manipulated by the allocation and or production of resources, such as the stock o f i n ternally produced assets human or non-human, or by using other choice variables such a s location. There are, in general, non-linear tradeo s between reduction of production costs in stage two, and resource costs in stage one. Our model o ers an explanation of the emergence of an internal market within a m ulti-divisional rm, or more generally, a group of oligopolists. While we h a v e focused on the theory of oligopoly, it is clear that our framwork is applicable to other situations, for example, investment to manipulate peer pressure and guilt in a social or economic partnership see Kandel and Lazear 1992 for an interesting discussion.
A quite di erent class of cost manipulation, with cost of manipulating, involves the use of taxes and subsidies. It may be thought at rst that these are pecuniary transfers and thus have no real costs. Upon re ection, however, there is the cost of public nance, because any subsidy to rms must typically be nanced by taxing consumers in a distortionary manner. Also, to the extent that some rms are partly foreign-owned, subsidies are partially`leaked' away from the home country. The optimal taxation problem in the context of two-stage Cournot oligopoly games is therefore not trivial. An analysis of this class of cost manipulation problem is the subject matter of a companion paper, Long and Soubeyran 1997a. In what follows we set M = N for simplicity, and consider Cournot games, so that we identify the action x i with the output q i ; and the parameter i is used to in uence the marginal cost i .
Let rm i's production cost be C i q i ; i where both partial derivatives are positive. Assume C i q i ; i is strictly convex in q i : Let b q i be the ournot equilibrium output of rm i. 
